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INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYSIS
Prospects of a Triangular 
Relationship?
Energy Relations between the EU, 
Russia and Turkey
KRISTIN LINKE AND MARCEL VIËTOR (EDS.)
April 2010
 K The energy sector is the driving force in relations between the EU, Russia and Turkey. 
The EU is a major consumer, Russia a major supplier and Turkey is both an important 
consumer and a transit country, mainly for natural gas but also for crude oil. Since 
the three players share an interest in a secure and smooth energy supply and face 
common external challenges, this constellation suggests that they should explore the 
potential for a cooperative energy triangle between the EU, Russia and Turkey.
 K So far, however, three loose and partly inconsistent bilateral relationships prevail. 
Russia has started to rethink its Energy Strategy and to turn its attention away from 
the European Union towards new partners, such as China in the East and Turkey in 
the West. Turkey’s foreign energy policy, too, has ceased to focus on the EU and has 
instead begun to concentrate on its role as an energy hub for resources from Russia, 
the Middle East and the Caspian region.
 K Since energy relations between the EU and Russia, as well as between the EU and 
Turkey are in need of improvement, while relations between Russia and Turkey are 
flourishing, the EU in particular should pursue the development of a triangular en-
ergy architecture. This is even more important as natural gas is likely to play a crucial 
role in the necessary transformation process towards a supply based on low carbon 
energy sources. Success, however, is possible only if all three players understand tri-
lateral energy cooperation as a win–win situation, rather than as a bargaining tool 
to be used against one another.
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Introduction
Kristin Linke, Marcel Viëtor
In discussions of the European Union’s security of energy 
supply, politicians and experts have started to regard 
Turkey as the key country on a new supply route for con-
ventional energy sources. New pipelines crossing Turkish 
territory have been proposed to bring natural gas – and, 
to a lesser extent, also crude oil – from the Caspian, Cen-
tral Asian and Gulf regions to Europe. The debate on 
these projects has mainly concerned tapping non-Russian 
energy sources, sometimes in addition to, but often as an 
alternative to gas and oil from Russia.
In recent years, however, relations between Russia and 
Turkey have intensified considerably, especially in the en-
ergy sector. Turkey has become an important market for 
energy from Russia, and it is likely soon to become an 
important transit country for Russian gas and oil as well. 
Thus, the European Union, which has been used to purely 
bilateral relations with both countries for decades, is now 
facing a changing situation and needs to reconsider rela-
tions between itself, Russia and Turkey.
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the German Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations (DGAP) organised an interna-
tional experts’ meeting on this topic in Berlin in Decem-
ber 2009. Participants with political, business and aca-
demic backgrounds were invited, from EU institutions 
and member states, as well as from Russia and Turkey. 
The aim of the meeting was to explore the potential for 
a cooperative energy triangle between the EU, Russia 
and Turkey, instead of three loose and partly inconsistent 
bilateral relationships. We are delighted to be able to 
share part of the discussion and further considerations 
with a broader public through this collection of four 
papers.
Friedemann Müller starts by asserting that the prospects 
of a common EU energy policy have improved under the 
Lisbon Treaty, and goes on to elaborate three major chal-
lenges that the EU will face in the future: oil and mobility, 
renewable energy and climate change, and natural gas 
and supply infrastructure. One of his conclusions is that 
natural gas will play an important role in the necessary 
transformation process towards a supply based on low 
carbon energy sources. In addition, he states that, as the 
supply structure becomes more complex, Russia, Turkey 
and the European Union could be seen as the possible 
core of a new triangular market architecture, an option 
worth developing more thoroughly.
Yurdakul Yiğitgüden presents Turkey’s foreign energy 
policy, which has, in the EU’s perception, shifted from the 
European periphery to being a new central element of 
energy policy, an energy hub. He also describes the major 
infrastructure projects involving Turkey and Russia, and 
Turkey and the European Union. To him, the intensified 
energy cooperation between Russia and Turkey has two 
main consequences for the EU: it will help to increase the 
volume of gas flowing to EU countries, but it will also 
harm the European Union’s efforts to diversify its gas im-
ports away from Russia. He suggests, consequently, that 
the European Union deepen its energy cooperation with 
Turkey, and also that Turkey and the EU speed up acces-
sion negotiations.
Tatiana Mitrova points out that Russia’s new Energy Strat-
egy until 2030 is aimed at developing new export mar-
kets in East Asia, besides traditional European markets. 
Other strategic priorities of Russia’s foreign energy policy 
include a focus on liquefied natural gas (LNG) and the 
diversification of export routes through new pipeline 
projects. She highlights that this shift is mainly motivated 
by an emotional politicisation of energy relations be-
tween Russia and its main customers in the EU. Energy 
relations between Russia and Turkey are, on the contrary, 
based on purely pragmatic economic incentives and de-
veloping substantially. As a result of becoming a major 
transport corridor for Russian gas and oil exports to the 
EU, Turkey will gain considerable leverage in negotiations 
with both Russia and the EU.
Stefan Meister states that the mainly energy driven eco-
nomic cooperation, which has led to the Russian–Turkish 
rapprochement, also entails a security dimension and can 
pose the key to settling several conflicts in the South 
Caucasus. If Turkey and Russia eventually manage to 
solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and if Turkey nor-
malises its relations with Armenia, this could also enable 
the establishment of a new and secure transport corridor 
for gas and oil from the Caspian and Central Asian re-
gions. There, the EU, Russia and Turkey face the same 
main competitor – China – and would therefore be well 
advised to develop comprehensive trilateral energy coop-
eration. He concludes, however, that this is unlikely to 
happen until all three players understand trilateral energy 
cooperation as a win–win situation, rather than as a bar-
gaining tool to be used against one another.
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It is obvious that a cooperative energy triangle between 
the EU, Russia and Turkey is far from a reality or even a 
priority of its political leaders, since bilateral thinking pre-
vails. But the potential benefits of triangular cooperation 
are also evident as the three players share an interest in a 
secure and smooth energy supply and face common ex-
ternal challenges. Since energy relations between the EU 
and Russia, as well as between the EU and Turkey are in 
need of improvement, while relations between Russia 
and Turkey are flourishing, the EU in particular should 
pursue a triangular architecture as an especially fruitful 
approach.
We would like to express our sincere gratitude to the four 
authors and all other speakers and participants in the 
meeting for sharing their thoughts with us. We would 
like to continue this discussion and hope that this collec-
tion of papers will interest the reader and develop the 
debate about the European Union’s security of energy 
supply.
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A European Energy Policy – Challenges and Perspectives
Friedemann Müller
1. Introduction
While few doubt the necessity of a common European 
energy policy, the struggle over national and corporate 
interests has long undermined the substance of such a 
policy. As a result, it is good news that the goals of a uni-
fied EU energy policy have largely been clarified and 
competences for implementing this policy unambigu-
ously assigned as a result of the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty. As described in Article 176A of the Treaty, 
»Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity 
between Member States, to:
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market;
(b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union;
(c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the 
development of new and renewable forms of energy; 
and
(d) promote the interconnection of energy networks.«
Although the Treaty will not put an end to conflicting 
interests within the European Union, it will contribute to 
solving some of the most important challenges facing a 
common European energy policy and pave the way for an 
unprecedented restructuring of energy supply in Europe.
Among the challenges is the question of how to deal 
with nuclear energy and coal, given that both types of 
energy are likely to lose market share, according to all 
serious estimates. Despite this expected decline, it re-
mains to be seen whether carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) will maintain the relevance of coal in electricity pro-
duction over the next four to five decades and whether 
nuclear power can be used to buy some badly needed 
time during the transition to widespread use of renewa-
ble energy, a particularly controversial question. It is clear 
that the share of oil in the European energy mix will fall 
in the same manner as coal and nuclear power. Natural 
gas is likely to obtain a larger share during the coming 
decades as a substitute for oil, which is more emissions-
intensive and has less abundant reserves, and also for 
coal, a particularly emissions-intensive type of fuel if CCS 
technology cannot be sufficiently developed.
Three issues in particular are likely to constitute the major 
challenges for the European Union in this restructuring 
process: oil and mobility, renewable energy and climate 
change, and natural gas and supply infrastructure. They 
shall therefore be closely examined in this chapter, which 
will first describe the challenges and then offer policy rec-
ommendations. A particular focus will be the issue of 
natural gas and supply infrastructure.
 K Oil and mobility. How can distribution conflicts be pre-
vented and oil-based mobility secured? Global oil pro-
duction is expected to peak, while global oil demand is 
expected to skyrocket as emerging economies (including 
Asian countries, which alone account for three times as 
many inhabitants as all industrialised countries com-
bined) increasingly motorise, following the model set by 
industrialised countries during the second half of the 
twentieth century.
 K Renewable energy and climate change. What are the 
most effective and economical instruments for organis-
ing a transition from the Fossil Fuel Age to the Age of 
Renewable Energy? It is clear that a new energy supply 
structure based on renewable energy sources must be 
established within a short time if the goal of fighting 
climate change according to the Climate Convention 
(1992) and the Bali Accord should be reached. The 
change from a still high growth of global greenhouse gas 
emissions to a decline has to happen before 2020.1 How-
ever, it is equally evident that the challenge of bringing 
about a full transition to renewable energy will occupy 
European policy-makers for many decades to come.
 K Natural gas and supply infrastructure. How can 
Europe, as the world’s largest importer of natural gas, 
organise its supply infrastructure in a way that ensures 
supply, meets the needs of the domestic market and pro-
motes competition?
2. What Are the Major Challenges?
2.1 Oil and Mobility
Oil production has peaked in many regions of the world, 
including North America and Europe, but also in coun-
tries such as OPEC founding member Indonesia. Other 
regions, such as the Caspian Sea, can still increase their 
production. However, evidence is mounting that global 
oil production can be expected to peak within a relatively 
short timeframe. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 
1.  IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change: Summary 
for Policymakers, p. 15. Available at: http://www.ipcc-wg3.de/publications/
assessment-reports/ar4/.files-ar4/SPM.pdf (accessed on 8 March 2010).
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projects that this peak will occur around 2020, while oth-
ers, such as the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and 
Gas, expect the peak even earlier. The question on the 
supply side of whether global oil production will level off 
or whether it will be possible to continue to increase pro-
duction by a small amount (perhaps 1 per cent) is eclipsed 
by the gravity of the situation on the demand side. Auto-
mobile stock in China is anticipated to grow more than 
tenfold by 2030, compared to 2005, with similar growth 
to be expected in India.2 The transportation sector, of 
which 92 per cent depends on oil as a fuel, is the fastest 
growing consumer of oil worldwide, according to the IEA 
World Energy Outlook 2009. The growing imbalance be-
tween demand and supply, which was only temporarily 
suspended by the recent economic crisis, will lead to dis-
tribution conflicts, as we have seen in Africa (Sudan and 
Nigeria) and thus directly impact European security inter-
ests, unless it massively accelerates the development of 
alternative fuels for the transportation sector in countries 
with advanced technological capacities.
2.2 Renewable Energy and Climate Change
At the European Council meeting in Brussels on 
8–9 March 2007, the European Union committed itself 
to an integrated climate and energy policy. This commit-
ment was the logical result of a recognition that the na-
ture of energy production in Europe, as in the rest of the 
world, must be transformed. This transformation has be-
come necessary as a result of the fact that fossil fuels, like 
oil, are an exhaustible resource but more importantly be-
cause the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere with 
regard to carbon dioxide is limited. Almost 80 per cent of 
energy needs in the European Union are met through 
fossil fuels, namely oil, coal and natural gas. This situa-
tion is not sustainable and is incompatible with EU com-
mitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (mainly 
carbon dioxide) by at least 20 per cent, compared to 
1990, by 2020 and by 85 per cent by 2050.
2.3 Natural Gas and Supply Infrastructure
More than other energy sources, supply of natural gas 
has become an issue of security policy concern as a result 
of the fact that shortfalls in the supply of natural gas can 
2.  IEA, World Energy Outlook 2008, p. 100 figure 3.7.
be balanced through spot markets only to a limited de-
gree, unlike shortfalls in the supply of oil. The establish-
ment of strategic reserves to bridge temporary gaps in 
supply is also more complicated and expensive than in 
the case of oil, and no EU-wide mutual assistance regime 
is currently in place to ensure continuity of supply in case 
one member state should face a supply crisis. The con-
centration of supply to Europe in the hands of a few 
natural gas producers, cemented by the limited diversifi-
cation in transport infrastructure, especially in Central 
and Eastern Europe, is a further cause for concern. For 
example, Germany, as the largest consumer of natural 
gas in the European Union, can obtain imports only from 
the North Sea and Russia (and not from other sources, 
such as Algeria, Nigeria and Qatar) due to the absence of 
necessary infrastructure to permit greater diversity of 
supply. Major pipelines connecting Russia with Western 
and Southern Europe also lack reverse flow capability. As 
a result, in January 2009 the interruption in the westward 
flow of natural gas from Russia, brought about by a dis-
pute with Ukraine, left southeast Europe in a serious sup-
ply crisis that could not be addressed by channelling back 
natural gas available downstream.
These obvious deficiencies in the natural gas supply infra-
structure are partly related to the very nature of natural 
gas but are also due to the lack of general awareness 
with regard to security of supply as a public good which 
cannot be adequately provided by the private sector 
alone. Transporting natural gas by tanker is not as 
straightforward as in the case of oil. Specialised infra-
structure is required to produce liquid natural gas (LNG) 
through liquefaction and to recover natural gas through 
regasification at the ports of departure and arrival, re-
spectively. The costs of infrastructure are such that it is 
usually cheaper to transport natural gas by pipeline over 
distances less than 4,000 kilometres, while in some cases 
geographical factors make the use of LNG uneconomical, 
even over greater distances. Given the geographical situ-
ation of Europe, with 80 per cent of the world’s known 
reserves within 5,000 kilometres of its borders, the use of 
pipelines is far cheaper than the alternative. However, 
what pipeline infrastructure lacks is flexibility: its end-
points are largely fixed, as is its transport capacity. Due to 
the nature of this infrastructure, importers and exporters 
generally conclude long-term supply contracts, limiting 
competition. In Russia, the world’s largest exporter of 
natural gas, Gazprom, enjoys a monopoly on sales of 
natural gas, further limiting competition. Major import 
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companies are in turn bound to Gazprom through long-
term supply contracts and capital exchange, thus making 
them adversaries of the emergence of a competitive im-
port market. For example, E.ON-Ruhrgas, the owner for 
decades of the only potential LNG site in Germany, has 
still not developed this site, thus preventing Germany 
from obtaining LNG.
Discussions on major pipeline projects have often dealt 
only in a cursory manner with the issue of establishing an 
optimal European supply infrastructure, which would im-
ply taking into account security of supply and market ef-
ficiency. The discussion on the Nord-Stream Pipeline from 
Vyborg in Russia through the Baltic Sea to the German 
port of Greifswald has focused almost exclusively on the 
question of whether it would be fair to exclude the Baltic 
Sea littoral states from the pipeline route rather than 
dealing with its implications for competition and import 
diversification. Although fierce and often bitter, the de-
bate on the Nabucco pipeline project has also remained 
rather superficial. This pipeline is intended to run from 
Eastern Turkey through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary 
to Baumgarten near Vienna in Austria and be supplied 
with natural gas from fields in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan 
and possibly Kazakhstan, Iraq, Iran and even Egypt. The 
supporters of this project argue that it would make 
Europe less dependent on Russian natural gas and link 
Europe as the world’s largest natural gas importer to a 
region even richer in natural gas than Russia. The oppo-
nents of the project point out that it is unclear whether 
states other than Azerbaijan could actually feed sufficient 
quantities of natural gas into the pipeline and that the 
pipeline would cover only 5 per cent of demand in 
Europe, while offending Russia as the EU’s most impor-
tant supplier. As a result, they claim, the benefits of the 
project would be outweighed by its costs. This debate 
does not address a number of important questions, how-
ever:
 K Can Europe afford not to be linked to the region of 
the world richest in natural gas, spanning from the 
Southern Caspian to the Persian Gulf, at a time when 
Russia has declared its intention to direct its additional 
export capacity towards the Asian emerging economies?
 K Can Europe depend on Russia to maintain its gas de-
liveries, even if resources become scarce, transit problems 
arise or political disputes emerge between Russia and Eu-
rope? The pressure applied by Russia on Europe during its 
WTO accession process does not give cause for optimism 
in this respect.
 K Should Europe pass up the opportunity to exploit its 
comparative advantage of being geographically posi-
tioned close to more than 70 per cent of world natural 
gas reserves? With the necessary infrastructure in place, 
this advantage would allow the establishment of a truly 
competitive market, the world’s largest, together with a 
spot market extensive enough to set a price for natural 
gas independent of the price of oil.
These issues cannot be resolved solely by the Nabucco 
pipeline project, but do draw attention to the fact that 
Europe must not only diversify its natural gas imports but 
also step up its diplomatic efforts to resolve problems 
burdening the European Union’s relations with Iran, Turk-
menistan (including the legal problem of a pipeline cross-
ing the Caspian Sea), Iraq with its neglected natural gas 
production, and even Qatar, which could transport natu-
ral gas to Europe far more cheaply by pipeline than by 
tanker via a route around Cape Horn.
3. What Is to Be Done?
With its green paper »Towards a European Strategy for 
the Security of Energy Supply«, published in 2000, the 
European Commission launched a campaign to draw at-
tention to the emerging issue of energy scarcity and to 
deficiencies in the approach taken to deal with climate 
change. This green paper was widely disparaged by crit-
ics, who attacked the Commission for claiming compe-
tences they felt should remain with member state gov-
ernments and the private sector. Nonetheless, the Com-
mission has been vindicated insofar as the issues 
highlighted in its green paper have become matters of 
public concern in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001, the war in Iraq in 2003 and the sub-
sequent dramatic rise in oil prices, and the natural gas 
conflict between Russia and the Ukraine in 2006, not to 
mention the fact that it has become apparent that green-
house gas emissions would grow despite the entry into 
force of the Kyoto Protocol.
A new green paper, entitled »A European Strategy for 
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy«, was issued 
by the European Commission on 8 March 2006. This 
green paper took up many of the same ideas that had 
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been raised in the earlier green paper but was received 
far more positively by decision-makers in Europe. Ulti-
mately, the paper induced the European Council to re-
quest a more strategic document from the Commission, 
to be delivered at the beginning of 2007. The resulting 
paper, »An Energy Policy for Europe«, was issued on 
10 January 2007 and led to a number of decisions by the 
European Council during the German Presidency in the 
first half of 2007, including the adoption of the »Energy 
Action Plan« in March 2007. This Action Plan outlines a 
number of goals with regard to improving competition in 
the internal market, promoting the establishment of in-
frastructure linking Europe to outside suppliers, improv-
ing energy saving and reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions. It also set specific targets, including a 20 per cent 
improvement in energy efficiency, a 20 per cent share of 
renewables in European energy production and a 20 per 
cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (as a unilat-
eral measure) or a 30 per cent reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions (if other states took corresponding meas-
ures), all to be achieved by 2020. The collection of 
measures proposed to reach these goals and targets did 
not lead to a comprehensive strategy, however. Many 
problems, such as a phasing-out of oil as Europe’s major 
energy source, were not addressed.
The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 Decem-
ber 2009, provides for and indeed requires the establish-
ment of a common European strategy, combining in a 
comprehensive programme the most critical aspects of a 
transformation of energy use in Europe, namely: (1) an 
end to the Oil Age; (2) an energy demand structure that 
is compatible with climate policy imperatives; and (3) a 
common European policy for ensuring the security of en-
ergy supply in the field of natural gas distribution through 
a storage and solidarity system comparable to the exist-
ing one for oil and the construction of transport infra-
structure (LNG ports and a pipeline network internally 
and between relevant suppliers and EU territory).
3.1 Oil: An Exit Strategy
Given that almost half of all explorable conventional oil 
has already been consumed and that three billion people 
in the Asian emerging economies alone are moving to-
wards adopting an industrialised lifestyle, with mobility 
comparable to that of the advanced industrialised coun-
tries, the need to establish an exit strategy from the Oil 
Age has become urgent, particularly in the latter. The 
emerging economies, due to their lower level of eco-
nomic and technological development, will need more 
time to organise this transformation process.
Such a transformation cannot imply an end to, or even a 
significant reduction, of mobility in industrialised coun-
tries. Rather it will require a substitution of oil by other, 
non-fossil fuel energy sources. Currently, 52 per cent of 
oil consumption in the European Union is accounted for 
by the transport sector, a figure that is likely to rise, ac-
cording to the IEA World Energy Outlook 2009. In other 
sectors (heating and industry), oil can easily be substi-
tuted by natural gas. In the transport sector, the most 
feasible alternatives are electricity, biomass (which poses 
concerns with respect to food security) and hydrogen, 
although hydrogen, depending on the technology ap-
plied, might also require electricity for its production. 
Covering the additional electricity requirements of the 
transport sector using renewable energy will be a major 
challenge for the European Union.
To create incentives for a technological revolution in the 
transport sector, the European Union should promote 
R&D in this area and set up a regulatory regime in line 
with a strategy to progressively reduce reliance on oil, 
such as a ban on cars using oil as their primary fuel from 
2030. These measures should drive competition within 
the car industry to develop the automobiles of the future. 
Nonetheless, even if these actions are taken, I assume 
that it will be at least three decades before the transpor-
tation sector no longer relies on oil, with the aviation sec-
tor potentially requiring an even longer transition period.
3.2 Renewable Energy: Climate Policy Imperatives
If the EU’s goal of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHG) by at least 20 per cent compared to 1990 by 2020 
and by 85 per cent by 2050 are to be reached, dramatic 
measures will have to be taken to improve energy effi-
ciency, promote energy saving and shift the energy mix 
away from fossil fuels towards renewable energy. The 
experience of the past twenty years shows that energy 
efficiency (energy consumption per GDP unit) cannot be 
improved in highly developed countries or regions such 
as the European Union by more than 2 per cent per year. 
In fact, during the past ten years, energy efficiency has 
improved at a rate of less than 1 per cent per year. Gov-
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ernment programmes have only had limited impact on 
energy saving habits, at least in the short term. Consider-
ing that economic growth is expected (and desirable), the 
impact of efficiency improvements and energy savings on 
total energy consumption will mostly be negated by eco-
nomic growth. Major efforts must therefore be made to 
increase the share of renewables in the energy mix. Not 
only are new technologies needed to this end, but so are 
major investments to substitute above all coal in electric-
ity production and oil in the transport sector with renew-
ables (wind power, solar power and biomass). In future, 
electricity should be expected to increase its share in en-
ergy consumption with respect to the direct use of pri-
mary energy sources in the transport sector but also in 
household use and industry.
The European Union has committed itself to reducing 
GHG emissions unilaterally by 20 per cent with respect to 
1990 levels by 2020 and by 30 per cent, if other coun-
tries similarly commit themselves to emissions reductions. 
The failure of the Copenhagen Summit in December 
2009, at least in terms of its original goal of establishing 
binding emission reduction targets, has created uncer-
tainty about EU obligations. Some member states are 
likely to argue that the European Union should not ex-
pose itself to further a competitive disadvantage if other 
countries, such as the United States or China, refuse to 
accept restrictions of their own. However, the European 
Union would be well advised to take a more progressive 
stance, keeping in mind that the cost of not taking action 
to mitigate climate change will be far greater than the 
cost of reducing GHG emissions, as Nicholas Stern, 
former Chief Economist at the World Bank, made clear in 
his famous 2006 report. Market mechanisms will be es-
sential to ensuring that the least-cost approach is taken 
to reducing GHG emissions. This implies that fossil fuels 
are priced at a level that would internalise the costs of 
carbon emissions resulting from their use, correcting dis-
torted market signals and ensuring that the »polluter 
pays« principle is applied. The European Union launched 
an effort in 2005 to establish such a price through the 
Emissions Trading System (ETS). Under the ETS, emission 
certificates will be auctioned and no longer distributed 
for free from 2013 onwards. However, a full internalisa-
tion of the costs of emissions requires a steady reduction 
in the number of emission permits available on the mar-
ket, thus permitting the European Union to respect the 
obligations it has assumed in terms of burden sharing. 
Such an approach would be far more constructive than 
the one that ultimately led to the failure of negotiations 
in Copenhagen.
Pressure is building to reach a new global climate agree-
ment soon, and the European Union will certainly have 
to keep its commitment to reduce emissions by 30 per 
cent on the table in order to move other countries to join 
a burden-sharing regime. Reducing emissions by 30 per 
cent by 2020 is an extremely ambitious undertaking, 
however. To reach this target, significant steps will be re-
quired to improve energy efficiency and transform the 
electrical power and automobile industries, in particular. 
Carbon capture and storage should be supported as a 
stopgap, but a much more rapid increase in the use of 
renewables for power generation will be indispensable 
for the long term. If a fair price is attributed to fossil fuels 
by making the purchase of emission certificates manda-
tory, demand for renewable energy sources will develop 
naturally.
Local wind and photovoltaic power production will cer-
tainly not be able to cover demand by themselves. Larger 
projects, such as solar power production in North Africa, 
will have to be considered. Industry is obviously ready to 
invest in such projects, as the huge Desertec solar power 
project demonstrates. However, concerns such as provid-
ing legal security for investors, protecting production 
sites and transport lines against terrorist attacks, and 
combating corruption must be taken seriously and dealt 
with at an appropriate political level. To this end, a high-
level dialogue should be established with governments in 
North Africa in particular.
At the same time as the use of renewables is increased in 
power production, a transformation of the transport sec-
tor, most of all the automobile industry, must be effected, 
so that the use of fossil fuels in this sector is ultimately 
eliminated entirely. This process should be coordinated 
not only within the European Union but also at the OECD 
or G8 level in order to avoid a massive distortion of com-
petition.
3.3 Natural Gas: A Common Policy for 
Security of Supply
Two tasks will be essential to ensuring the security of Eu-
rope’s natural gas supply. First, the European Union must 
establish the internal transport infrastructure to deliver 
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natural gas from its point of arrival – pipeline terminals or 
LNG ports – to where it is needed, develop storage ca-
pacities and organise a solidarity-based distribution sys-
tem to be activated in case of a supply emergency. Sec-
ond, the European Union must do more to establish an 
external transport infrastructure that would allow any 
potential supplier to deliver natural gas to Europe. The 
European Union must accept that Russia will remain its 
major natural gas supplier for decades to come. At the 
same time, Russia must come to understand that it can-
not treat natural gas as a product different from oil and 
other raw materials, with its supply subject to a different 
set of rules and principles. Furthermore, exclusive long-
term contracts must not continue to dominate supply 
relationships. The share of natural gas in the European 
energy mix having grown constantly over recent decades, 
it is too important as an energy source for it not to be 
fully exploited to improve the EU’s security of supply posi-
tion.
Although the European Union has made much progress 
with regard to a common policy for security of supply in 
the natural gas sector, the results have been far from suf-
ficient. In 2008, the European Union had a storage ca-
pacity of 80 billion cubic metres, the equivalent of 
roughly 15 per cent of annual consumption (533 billion 
cubic metres) and 25 per cent of annual imports from 
outside the European Union (319 billion cubic metres). 
The differences in storage capacity between EU member 
states are considerable. In Italy and France, storage ca-
pacity represents 15 per cent of annual consumption, in 
Germany 26 per cent, in Austria and Slovakia above 
40 per cent and in Latvia over 100 per cent. By contrast, 
many smaller countries have much lower storage capaci-
ties; nine EU member states have next to no storage ca-
pacity at all. The projected expansion of storage facilities 
would lead to an overall increase in capacity of 67 per 
cent,3 resulting in capacity equivalent to 25 per cent, or 
90 days, of annual consumption. If this capacity is fully 
utilised, it will provide a reserve similar in extent to the oil 
reserves required by the International Energy Agency of 
its member states, a group of countries nearly identical in 
membership to the OECD.
3.  Wochenbericht des DIW No. 48/2009, Hella Engerer, Manfred Horn, 
Anne Neumann, Bei erneutem Gasstreit zwischen Ukraine und Russland: 
Wäre Europa jetzt gewappnet? Berlin 2009, pp. 837–43. Available at: 
http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.343853.de/
09-48-3.pdf (accessed on 8 March 2010).
The expansion of natural gas reserves will do little to re-
solve the problem posed by insufficient transport infra-
structure. In the absence of a comprehensive initiative to 
address this problem, those countries in Central, Eastern 
and South-Eastern Europe with the highest dependence 
on Russian natural gas will remain vulnerable to supply 
crises, even if overall storage capacity is increased. Al-
though the LNG import capacity of ports in the European 
Union, currently at 108 billion cubic metres, is expected 
to increase during the next five years, this expansion will 
also not benefit the countries with the greatest vulnera-
bility to an interruption in the flow of Russian natural gas.
As a result, providing the possibility of »reverse flow« is 
urgently necessary, although resisted by the owners of 
the pipelines, since this might attract competition. In this 
context, it is understandable that the European Commis-
sion is pushing for an unbundling of the ownership of 
production and transportation capacities. It remains to be 
seen whether the European Union is also able and willing 
to engage itself in and possibly pay for the provision of 
supply security as a public good. To this end, the Euro-
pean Commission could either take regulatory measures 
to force pipeline owners to install reverse flow equipment 
or cover the cost of installation with taxpayers’ money.
Outside EU territory, measures will have to be taken to 
diversify transport infrastructure for importing natural 
gas into the European Union and to establish a legal 
framework that would give investors and importers secu-
rity with regard to their contracts with suppliers. The En-
ergy Charter Treaty (ECT) provides for such a regime, but 
neither the most important supplier, Russia, nor current 
and potential suppliers in Africa (Algeria, Libya and 
Nigeria) and in the Middle East (Iran and Iraq) are parties 
to the Treaty. Thus, the European Union would be well 
advised to heed the proposal made by President Dmitry 
Medvedev of Russia in April 2009 for a revised ECT, even 
if Medvedev’s proposal as such is not acceptable.
Policy aimed at the diversification of natural gas supplies 
should not be restricted to support for additional pipe-
lines, such as the Nabucco pipeline, which has been desig-
nated by the European Commission as one of four priority 
projects in the energy sector (the other three being linked 
to electricity infrastructure). It should also aim at the es-
tablishment of a political framework that would make 
possible economic deals and investments of a meaningful 
order of magnitude. Approaches to addressing different 
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concerns associated with negotiating supply projects with 
countries such as Iran, Iraq, Turkmenistan and Libya need 
to be given more attention if deals for importing natural 
gas are to be concluded.
Russia, however, will remain the major supplier for 
Europe, while Turkey could become the main transit 
country which ships natural gas from the Middle East, the 
Caspian region and Russia to Europe. It is high time that 
this changed market constellation was recognised and 
common strategies developed to optimise the supply 
structure.
4. Conclusions
Two events that took place in December 2009 – the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the failure of the 
Copenhagen climate summit – should impel the Euro-
pean Union to lay out a long-term energy strategy that is 
nothing less than a strategy to bring about an end to the 
Oil Age and the dawn of the Age of Renewable Energy. 
The Lisbon Treaty provides the European Union with a 
mandate to establish a common energy policy based on 
solidarity, sustainability, security of supply and economic 
efficiency. The failure of the Copenhagen negotiations 
should be seen as a signal that the European Union will 
have to take an even greater leadership role in a process 
in which it has held a leading position over the past two 
decades, during which time China and the United States 
as the major powers and emitters have been unable to 
lead for domestic reasons.
Coal, linked to carbon capture and storage technology, 
may still have a role to play for a while. What is clear is 
that there is not enough oil on the world market to sat-
isfy the growing demand from the global transport sector 
if 90 per cent of the sector continues to be fuelled by oil. 
Demand for oil is further kept high by a price that does 
not fully take into account its environmental costs, the 
costs of securing its supply and the costs of conflicts 
linked to its distribution.
As a result, regulatory measures will have to be put in 
place to bring about: (1) the internalising of the costs of 
GHG emissions through a trading system that makes 
emissions-free energy sources competitive, and (2) an 
end to the use of oil as a fuel, particularly in the transport 
sector. The sooner the European Union can bring about 
such a transformation, the more competitive the Euro-
pean economy will be in the future. The European Union 
should not only be a pioneer in this transformation proc-
ess for its own sake but also to provide a model for other 
developed and emerging economies. The EU Emission 
Trading System is a good start in this direction. However, 
the European Union must develop it further by expand-
ing it to include all energy-consuming sectors, by fully 
integrating the »polluter pays« principle and by providing 
incentives to implement a global emission trading sys-
tem, which would finally internalise the costs of green-
house gas emissions at an international level.
Natural gas, however, will certainly play an important role 
in the transition away from more carbon-intensive 
sources of energy over at least the next four decades. The 
cleanest of the fossil fuels and with comparably abun-
dant reserves must be utilised in a modernised market 
structure, including an extended supply infrastructure.4 
The increased number of transit countries, the diversifica-
tion of Russian exports and the emergence of new op-
tions on the supply side make a more complex supply 
structure necessary. This should be seen as an opportu-
nity by suppliers, transit countries and consumers alike. 
In this regard, a potential triangle of Russia (as a supplier), 
Turkey (as a transit country and consumer) and the Euro-
pean Union (as a consumer) could be seen as the possible 
core of a new market architecture, an option which is 
well worth developing more thoroughly.
4.  The majority of new power stations is still based on fossil fuels. If we 
exclude the CCS option with its unclear potential for realisation, we have 
to support natural gas power stations instead of coal power stations. This 
is because of the lower emissions and lower investment costs of natural 
gas power stations. However, due to their expected lifetime of about four 
decades, it will take such a long time until these power stations might be 
substituted by electricity from renewable energy.
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Turkey – Turning the European Periphery into an Energy Hub?
Yurdakul Yiğitgüden
1. The Turkish Energy Sector
During the period 1990–2008 primary energy demand in 
Turkey grew at a rate of 4.3 per cent. Under the influence 
of the global crisis, however, Turkish energy demand has 
fallen, from 107.6 million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) 
in 2007 to 106.3 mtoe in 2008.1 It is expected that pri-
mary energy demand will grow, on average, by 4 per cent 
annually until 2020. The share of imported energy has 
increased over the past ten years from 64 per cent to 
73 per cent and, according to different scenarios, will in-
crease to 75 per cent or 78 per cent by 2020. In the 
1970s, oil was the main energy resource in Turkey, with 
a share of about 55 per cent. Turkey started to import 
natural gas in 1987, and by 2008 it had become the lead-
ing energy source, with a share of 32 per cent, followed 
by oil at 30 per cent and coal at 28 per cent. The share 
of renewable energy in the primary energy mix is about 
4 per cent.
In 2008, indigenous crude oil production in Turkey was 
2.2 million tonnes. In the same year, 21.7 million tonnes 
of crude oil were imported from the main producer coun-
tries in the Middle East, including Iran (35 per cent), 
Saudi Arabia (14 per cent) and Iraq (9 per cent), as well 
as from Russia (33 per cent) and Kazakhstan (3 per cent). 
Russia had the highest share of petroleum products (to-
tally 8.9 million tonnes), at 43 per cent. Between 1987 
and 1994, natural gas was imported only from the USSR. 
By 2008, however, indigenous natural gas production 
had reached 1 billion cubic metres (bcm). On top of that, 
a total of 37.8 bcm of natural gas was imported from 
Russia (62 per cent), Azerbaijan (12.3 per cent), Algeria 
(11.1 per cent), Iran (11.0 per cent), Nigeria (2.7 per cent) 
and other countries (0.9 per cent).
2. Turkey’s External Energy Policy
Turkey’s increasing dependence on energy imports is a 
major challenge for its foreign policy. Besides diversifying 
supply and energy sources, Turkey is strengthening its 
economic and political ties with supplier countries. In the 
1960s, Turkey proposed the development of an oil pipe-
line from Iran to the Turkish Mediterranean cost, but 
could not obtain the support of the Shah. The second at-
tempt, this time with Iraq in the 1970s, was successful. 
1.  Data from the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources.
The oil pipeline which runs from the Kirkuk oil fields of 
Northern Iraq to Ceyhan marine terminal on Turkey’s 
Mediterranean coast, with a capacity of 71 million tonnes 
per year, also supplies Turkish refineries. In the 1980s, 
then Prime Minister Turgut Özal promoted the develop-
ment of a natural gas pipeline from Qatar to Turkey and 
continuing to Europe. There was not much support from 
European countries for the expensive project, however, 
and Turkey’s natural gas demand forecasts did not justify 
the huge investment. During the same period, Turkey 
constructed the natural gas interconnector to the Bulgar-
ian border. Today, the Trans-Balkan natural gas pipeline 
from Russia – via Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bul-
garia – to Turkey can deliver 14 billion cubic metres per 
year (bcma) to the Turkish transmission system.
Turkey’s Caspian diplomacy in the late 1990s and early 
2000s was crowned by the commissioning of the Baku–
Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) crude oil pipeline and the Baku–
Tbilisi–Erzurum natural gas pipeline (BTE), both running 
from the Azerbaijani section of the Caspian Sea to Tur-
key. The 1,768 km long BTC pipeline – inaugurated in 
June 2006 – carries 1 million barrels per day (bpd) of 
crude oil from the Azeri–Chirag–Güneshli (ACG) fields of 
the Caspian Sea to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. The 
BTE natural gas pipeline runs parallel to the BTC pipeline. 
It is planned to extent its initial capacity of 7 bcma to 
20 bcma. Turkish policy has often been misinterpreted by 
foreign policy and energy experts. In their perception, 
Turkey intended to obtain the lion’s share of transport 
profits from Caspian energy.2 The other argument raised 
against Turkey was that the country was promoting un-
feasible pipeline projects by applying political pressure. In 
reality, the Turkish approach towards the Caspian Region 
and Central Asia was intended to strengthen the inde-
pendence and prosperity of the new independent states. 
To achieve this, the Turkish government provided the 
countries of the Caspian region and Central Asia with 
technical, educational, financial and military assistance. 
These measures were not limited to the oil- and gas-rich 
countries of the region. To diversify and secure its energy 
supply Turkey cooperated intensively with regional gov-
ernments to create favourable framework conditions for 
large energy infrastructure projects and invited interna-
tional companies to assess their economic feasibility. 
2.  ›Region of the Future: The Caspian Sea‹, Policy Paper of the SPD Bun-
destag parliamentary group, authored by Gernot Erler in cooperation 
with Friedemann Müller and Uwe Stehr, June 1998. Available at: http://
www.gernot-erler.de/old/ot/ot1e.html (accessed on 8 March 2010).
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None of the large cross-border pipeline projects can be 
realised without the firm support of the relevant govern-
ments. Turkey did not receive any support from its Euro-
pean allies for its Caspian Sea policy, and cooperated 
with the USA, instead. While developing the Caspian en-
ergy corridor Turkey did not neglect energy cooperation 
with other neighbours. The Iran–Turkey natural gas inter-
connector was built in 1997–2001 and had an initial ca-
pacity of 14 bcma. Its capacity can be extended substan-
tially by constructing additional compressor stations. The 
Blue Stream natural gas pipeline, running from Russia 
under the Black Sea to Turkey, became operational in 
2003 and has a capacity of 16 bcma.
The Turkish government is planning to bring Egyptian 
natural gas to Turkey. Under discussion is the extension 
of the Arab pipeline which runs from El-Arish in Egypt to 
the Syrian city of Homs to the Turkish border and the 
construction of an offshore pipeline across the Mediter-
ranean. Another important aim of Turkish external en-
ergy policy since the 1990s is to develop the gas fields of 
Iraq and connect them to the Turkish network. A Memo-
randum of Understanding (MoU) to prepare feasibility 
studies for a natural gas interconnector between Iraq and 
Turkey was signed in August 2007 in Ankara. The Sam-
sun–Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, with a capacity of 1.5 mil-
lion bpd and running from the Black Sea to Turkey’s Med-
iterranean coast, is under development. Other policy ini-
tiatives to transit natural gas to the EU will be discussed 
in the following sections of this chapter.
Turkey supports the efforts of Turkish public and private 
sector companies in the exploration and production of 
hydrocarbons abroad. The Turkish Petroleum Corpora-
tion (TPAO) has been active in the Caspian countries Az-
erbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan since 1993. The 
company has a 6.75 per cent share in the consortium 
producing 1 million bpd from the ACG fields and a 9 per 
cent share in the consortium producing 7.2 bcma of nat-
ural gas from the Shah Deniz fields, both in the Azerbai-
jani section of the Caspian Sea. In the second phase, 
Shah Deniz gas will be transported via Turkey to other 
European countries. In Kazakhstan, TPAO is producing 
3,400 bpd in a smaller onshore field. TPAO is participat-
ing with international companies in auctions for the Iraqi 
oil fields and in December 2009 won a contract in East-
ern Iraq. Turkish company Genel Enerji A.Ş., part of the 
Çukurova group, is successfully developing the Taq Taq 
and Tawke oil fields in Northern Iraq with Addax Interna-
tional in a 55–45 per cent joint-venture and has started 
to export production to world markets via the Kirkuk–
Ceyhan pipeline. TPAO is exploring oil fields in Libya and 
its subsidiary TPIC is engaged in exploration with the na-
tional oil company Ecopetrol in Colombia. Turkey has 
signed several protocols with Iran to develop the 22nd, 
23rd and 24th phases of the South Pars gas fields.
Turkish efforts to gain access to gas production and to 
explore potential gas fields in Turkmenistan have not 
been successful. The Trans-Caspian pipeline from Turk-
menistan to Turkey could not be realised. Kazakhstan has 
far more potential with regard to supplying Turkey with 
energy, but so far Turkish companies have not managed 
to take advantage of it. Some observers claim that Turkey 
needs one or two national champions to achieve its ex-
ternal energy policy goals. Some observers have pro-
posed that TPAO should again operate as a vertically in-
tegrated oil company, conducting the whole range of 
activities, from exploration, production, transport and re-
fining to retail. Others want to see the public pipeline 
company Botaş as a natural gas monopoly, extending its 
activities to the exploration and production of gas 
abroad.
3. Turkey as an Energy Hub
The main prerequisite for an energy hub is a good physi-
cal infrastructure. The length of the Turkish natural gas 
transmission network increased from 2,000 km in 2000 
to 12,300 km in 2009. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is con-
tributing more and more to the energy security of Euro-
pean countries. Turkey’s first LNG facility in Marmara 
Ereğlisi, 90 kilometres northwest of Istanbul, has been 
operational since 1994. The terminal can import 6 bcma 
of liquefied natural gas. Turkey’s second LNG facility was 
built by Çolakoğlu in a location north of Izmir. The termi-
nal has been in operation since 2006 and has a capacity 
of 6 bcma. Turkey’s energy infrastructure still lacks large-
scale storage capacities for natural gas. Underground 
natural gas storage may contribute to balance seasonal, 
daily and hourly changes in demand and is essential to 
maintain the gas flow to the consumer in the event of 
supply interruptions. The first underground storage facil-
ity in Turkey, with a capacity of 1.6 bcm, became opera-
tional in April 2007 in Silivri, near Istanbul. A second un-
derground storage facility, in Tuzgölü in Central Turkey 
and with 1 bcm capacity, is under development.
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Further conditions for a well functioning natural gas hub 
are a good business climate and a transparent transit re-
gime. The Natural Gas Market Act, No. 4646 of May 
2001, was an important step towards the liberalisation of 
the gas market in Turkey. The reduction of Botaş’s market 
share in the Turkish gas trade, carried out by auctioning 
its gas contracts, is one of the most significant aspects of 
the Act. Although severely delayed, the transfer of the 
first 4 bcm from Botaş contracts to private sector compa-
nies was an important step for market liberalisation. The 
start of the gas import and trading activities of the 
Çolakoğlu LNG terminal will also contribute to market 
development. The Turkish government should encourage 
trading by international gas brokers in Turkey and estab-
lish a more transparent transit regime.
4. Energy Cooperation between Turkey 
and Russia
During the Cold War, many industrial facilities in Turkey – 
including an oil refinery and a power plant – were built 
with Soviet financial and technical support. In 1984, Tur-
key and the USSR signed the first natural gas supply 
agreement (for 6 bcma). Gas flow commenced in 1987, 
via the Trans-Balkan pipeline, through Romania and Bul-
garia. Economic cooperation with the USSR was based 
on barter agreements and helped to increase Turkish ex-
ports – especially of traditional agricultural products – to 
its northern neighbour. Turkey signed a second natural 
gas agreement – for the supply of 8 bcma via the Trans-
Balkan pipeline – with the Russian Federation in 1996. 
Within the framework of the Natural Gas Market Act, 
Botaş transferred 4 bcma of the total 8 bcma of the sec-
ond agreement to private sector companies, including 
Bosporus Gas, a Gazprom joint venture in Turkey.
Blue Stream
In 1996, Russia made an offer to Turkey to supply addi-
tional natural gas via an offshore pipeline under the Black 
Sea. In December 1997, the Blue Stream agreement was 
signed between the two countries. Gas flows from Russia 
to Turkey via Blue Stream started in 2003. The total 
length of the pipeline is 1,213 km and the subsea section 
is 396 km long. The total cost of the Blue Stream pipeline 
is 3.2 billion US dollars.
Blue Stream II
A second subsea gas pipeline, parallel to Blue Stream, 
was first mentioned by the Russian side in 2002. In Au-
gust 2005, then President Vladimir Putin officially pro-
posed the building of the Blue Stream II gas pipeline to 
the Turkish Prime Minister. The Blue Stream II pipeline 
was intended to supply gas to Turkey and the Middle 
Eastern countries, including Israel. However, the main 
aim of Gazprom was to transit gas to Southeast Europe 
via Turkey. The Turkish side welcomed the offer, but gave 
priority to the Nabucco project from Turkey to Austria.
South Stream
In response to the progress of the Nabucco project and 
Turkey’s reluctance to support Blue Stream II, Gazprom 
signed an MoU with ENI of Italy in June 2007 to imple-
ment the South Stream pipeline project. South Stream 
starts at Russia’s Black Sea coast, where the Blue Stream 
subsea section starts, and continues to Bulgaria as an off-
shore pipeline. Russia signed intergovernmental agree-
ments with the transit countries Serbia, Bulgaria, Hun-
gary, Greece and Slovenia. During Prime Minister Putin’s 
visit to Ankara on 6 August 2009, Turkey granted 
Gazprom permission to carry out the necessary geologi-
cal research within the Turkish Economic Zone of the 
Black Sea. The capacity of the South Stream project has 
been increased twice by the project developers, reaching 
63 bcma. The total cost of the project is now estimated 
at 24 billion US dollars. The length of the offshore section 
of the pipeline will be about 900 km. From Bulgaria, two 
directions for the pipeline are under investigation: one via 
the Eastern Balkans to Central Europe and the other via 
the Western Balkans to Southern Europe.
Samsun–Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline
Heavy tanker traffic represents a serious environmental 
hazard for the Turkish Straits and the metropolitan area 
of Istanbul. In addition, weather conditions, particularly 
during the winter, cause long waiting times for crossing 
the Turkish Straits and therefore increase costs for the oil 
industry. The Samsun–Ceyhan crude oil pipeline project 
aims to bypass the congested Turkish Straits and trans-
port Russian and Caspian oil from the Black Sea coast 
east of Samsun to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. 
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The 550-km pipeline has a nominal design capacity of 
1.5 million bpd. ENI of Italy and Çalık Holding of Turkey 
are developing the project jointly. The ground-breaking 
ceremony was held on 24 April 2007 in Ceyhan, at-
tended by the Italian Minister for Economic Development 
and the Turkish Minister for Energy and Natural Re-
sources. The visit of Russian Prime Minister Putin to An-
kara in August 2009 increased the expectation that Rus-
sian companies may join the ENI / Çalık project. On 18 Oc-
tober 2009, Italy, Russia and Turkey signed an MoU on 
the Samsun–Ceyhan oil pipeline in Milan. On the same 
day, ENI / Çalık signed an MoU with JSC Transneft and 
OAO Rosneft to evaluate the participation of Russian 
companies in the project.
Other Areas of Energy Cooperation
According to the »Gas protocol« of 6 August 2009, the 
parties intend to jointly develop underground gas storage 
capacities in Turkey. The »Petroleum Protocol«, signed 
the same day, foresees joint exploration and production 
activities by Russian and Turkish companies in third coun-
tries. On 12 December 2009, a consortium made up of 
Gazprom, South Korea’s KoGas, Malaysia’s Petronas and 
Turkey’s TPAO was awarded a contract to work in the 
Badra field – one of the smallest – in Eastern Iraq. Lukoil 
has established its petrol station chain in Turkey and is 
evaluating plans for further growth. Russia and Turkey 
are also cooperating in the field of nuclear energy. A con-
sortium led by Atomstroyexport presented an offer to 
build and operate the first nuclear power plant in Turkey. 
The tender was cancelled due a court decision in Novem-
ber 2009.
Strategic Partnership Russia–Turkey
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, economic and 
political relations between Russia and Turkey have inten-
sified. Turkish construction companies, already active in 
Russia in the 1980s, have won contracts worth 25 billion 
US dollars in Russia over the past 20 years.3 In 2008, leav-
ing aside trade with the EU as a whole, Russia became 
Turkey’s number one trading partner. The trade volume 
between the two countries reached 37.9 billion US dol-
3.  ›General economic outlook of the Russian Federation and its eco-
nomic-commercial relations with Turkey‹, Trade Council of the Turkish 
Embassy, Moscow, July 2009 (in Turkish).
lars in 2008.4 Turkey is Russia’s fifth largest trading part-
ner. Russia has a huge surplus in bilateral trade, however: 
in 2008, Turkey’s imports from Russia increased to 
31.4 billion US dollars, the main items being natural gas, 
crude oil, petroleum products and coal, while Turkish ex-
ports – worth 6.5 billion US dollars – to Russia are mainly 
manufactured goods. According to the Turkish Trade 
Council in Moscow, direct investments by Turkish compa-
nies in Russia now stand at 7 billion US dollars. Close to 
3 million Russian tourists visit Turkey every year. Turkey is 
also interested in cooperation with Russia in the defence 
sector. The Russian company Rosoboron won the tender 
to provide the Turkish army with anti-tank missiles, sign-
ing the contract in August 2008.5 The war between 
Georgia and Russia in August 2008 also put pressure on 
relations between Russia and Turkey. Turkey has close re-
lations and cooperation with both countries and so 
found itself in a very difficult position. Ankara only mildly 
criticised the Russian intervention in Georgia and 
Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia 
as independent states.6 Turkey is promoting a Caucasus 
Stability Pact for the resolution of conflicts in the region, 
excluding external countries. The Georgia crisis also 
showed Turkey the vulnerability of the East–West Energy 
Corridor via Georgia.7
After the end of the Cold War, many Turkish intellectuals 
and high-ranking military officers were discussing an alli-
ance with Russia or a trilateral alliance between Israel, 
Russia and Turkey. Russia’s immense natural resources, 
Turkey’s rapidly growing economy, with its dynamic in-
dustry, and Israel’s high-tech know-how were seen as the 
potential strengths of such an alliance. Turkey’s relations 
with the United States cooled during the eight years of 
the Bush administration, mainly because of Turkey’s lack 
of support for the invasion of Iraq. The slow progress of 
EU accession negotiations and the negative attitude of 
France and Germany in particular towards Turkey’s mem-
bership dramatically reduced the popularity of the EU in 
Turkey. A strategic partnership between Russia and Tur-
4.  Data from the Under-Secretariat of Foreign Trade.
5.  Under-Secretariat for the Defence Industry.
6.  Adam Balcer, The Future of Turkish–Russian Relations: A Strategic Per-
spective. Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2009, pp. 79–90. Availa-
ble at: http://www.turkishpolicy.com/images/stories/2009-01-tpq/Adam
Balcer.pdf (accessed on 8 March 2010).
7.  Igor Torbakov, The Georgia Crisis and Russia–Turkey Relations. The 
Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC, 2008. Available at: http://www.
jamestown.org/uploads/media/GeorgiaCrisisTorbakov.pdf (accessed on 
8 March 2010).
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key was suggested first during the official visit of then 
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov to Turkey in 
2000. The joint declaration signed during the visit to Rus-
sia of Turkish President Abdullah Gül in February 2009 
was described by the Russian side as a »strategic docu-
ment«. The official visit of Prime Minister Putin to Turkey 
in August 2009 elevated energy cooperation between 
the two countries to a strategic level. According to Sergey 
Markov – Director of the Institute for Political Studies in 
Moscow – Russia and Turkey should establish a new eco-
nomic and political alliance.8 Russia plays an important 
role in the framework of Turkey’s new foreign policy, 
which is aimed at ensuring that there are »no problems 
with neighbours«. On the other hand, Turkey is aware of 
the imbalance between the two countries. Russia’s read-
iness to use military power to solve regional conflicts cer-
tainly does not fit into the picture of peaceful coopera-
tion in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Future Russian 
interference in the internal affairs of Turkic countries in 
the Caucasus and Central Asia may cause Turkey to 
change its policy towards Russia.9
5. Energy Cooperation between Turkey 
and the EU
The EU is Turkey’s largest trading partner by far. Roughly 
half of Turkey’s exports go to EU countries. EU (previously 
EEC) companies have a long track record in Turkey. After 
the Cold War, Turkey participated in the negotiations on 
the Energy Charter Treaty and signed it in December 
1994. During the following years, Turkey contributed to 
the negotiations on the Transit Protocol of the Energy 
Charter Treaty. Preparations for the synchronisation of 
the Turkish high voltage network with the European 
power network UCTE are at an advanced stage. In the 
rest of this section, the focus will be on the development 
of gas transmission networks from Turkey to the EU.
While developing the East–West energy corridor, Turkish 
plans included the channelling of natural gas from the 
Caspian region to other European countries. The Trans-
Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan to Turkey had a de-
sign capacity of 30 bcma: 14 bcma of the gas were fore-
seen for transit to Europe via Turkey. In 1998, Turkey 
8.  ›Russian Advisor Calls For Economic Union With Turkey, Post Soviet 
States‹. Available at: http://www.blacklistednews.com/news-1518-300-9-
9-- ,html (accessed on 8 March 2010).
9.  See footnote 6.
signed an MoU with Bosnia-Herzegovina for future gas 
supply. In the same year, during the bilateral energy com-
mission meeting with Austria, Turkey proposed to develop 
an infrastructure to transport Caspian gas to Central 
Europe. It should be noted that there was deadlock in 
relations with the EU after the December 1997 Luxem-
bourg summit and no political support came from Brussels 
or the EU member states for the development of the East–
West energy corridor. The EU’s attitude towards Turkey 
started to change in 1999. In addition to the aim of re-
habilitating relations with Turkey, the EU had two geopo-
litical reasons for this change. In 1998–99, Turkey made 
visible progress in negotiations on the BTC and the Trans-
Caspian pipeline. The other important consideration was 
Russia’s reluctance to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty or 
to accept articles of the Transit Protocol of the Treaty that 
would allow the transport of Caspian energy resources to 
the West via the Russian transmission network. In June 
1999, the European Commission invited Turkey to be-
come a Full Beneficiary Country of the INOGATE (Inter-
state Oil Gas Transport to Europe) programme.
South European Gas Ring
In June 2000, after a trilateral meeting in Brussels, the 
European Commission, Greece and Turkey signed a Con-
cluding Statement to implement the South European Gas 
Ring from Turkey via Greece to Italy. In the following 
years, the Greek and Turkish state-owned companies 
Depa and Botaş worked closely to develop a 296 km long 
Turkey–Greece gas interconnector. The construction 
work started in July 2005 and the pipeline was officially 
inaugurated in November 2007. The initial capacity of 
the pipeline – 7 bcma – may be extended in future to 
11 bcma. For the extension of the network from central 
Greece under the Adriatic Sea to Italy a company called 
IGI Poseidon S.A. was established in June 2008. The 
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline is the other pipeline project be-
tween Greece and Italy. The 520 km long pipeline will 
cross northern Greece and Albania, westwards. The off-
shore section of the pipeline is routed from the Albanian 
cost through the Adriatic Sea to Italy.
Nabucco
At the third Austrian–Turkish Joint Energy Commission 
meeting in November 2001 in Vienna, the parties agreed 
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to encourage natural gas companies from both countries 
to study the feasibility of natural gas transport from the 
Caspian region via Turkey to Austria. The meetings be-
tween OMV Erdgas and Botaş were concluded with a 
cooperation protocol, signed in May 2002. In October 
2002, Bulgargaz, Transgaz from Romania and MOL from 
Hungary joined the project. In June 2004, the Nabucco 
Company was established. In December 2007, RWE from 
Germany became the sixth shareholder of the pipeline 
consortium. In June 2009, an intergovernmental agree-
ment for the realisation of the Nabucco project was 
signed. The 3,300 km long pipeline will cost 7.9 billion 
euros and has a design capacity of 31 bcma. The Nabucco 
Company will make the final investment decision on the 
project in the last quarter of 2010.
The Future of the Southern Corridor
Both of the abovementioned projects enjoyed the finan-
cial support of the EU’s Trans-European Energy Networks 
programme for their economic and technical studies. 
However, the EU was criticised for the slow pace of the 
development, the lack of coordination between the 
projects and the contradictory decisions and policies of 
member states. All competing pipeline projects sup-
ported by an application from a member state to Brussels 
are on the EU’s priority list. There is no ranking of the 
projects based on their contribution to Europe’s energy 
security. Since 2007, the European Commission has been 
actively involved in negotiations on the intergovernmen-
tal agreement concerning the Nabucco project. In Sep-
tember 2007, the European Commission appointed 
former Dutch foreign minister Jozias Van Aartsen Euro-
pean coordinator for the Nabucco project (or for Natural 
Gas Route 3: Caspian Sea countries–Middle East–Euro-
pean Union or Southern Corridor). Van Aartsen visited 
the region and spoke to all relevant stakeholders, making 
a number of valuable suggestions.10 He recommended 
the further liberalisation of the Turkish natural gas mar-
ket, transportation of small volumes of gas from the sup-
plier countries to the EU via the existing networks until 
the new infrastructure is place, the standardisation of the 
legal framework, the establishment of a Caspian Devel-
opment Corporation and the extension of the Energy 
10.  Jozias Van Aartsen, Activity Report September 2007 – February 2009. 
Brussels, February 2009. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infra
structure/tent_e/doc/axis/2009_axis_linking_activity_report_2007_2009.
pdf (accessed on 8 March 2010).
Community Treaty to major transit countries. Some of his 
other proposals, however, seem to ignore today’s eco-
nomic and geopolitical realities in seeking to by-pass Tur-
key, including the White Stream offshore pipeline from 
Georgia to Romania, a new supply route via Cyprus, 
Crete and Greece and the development of Greece and 
Romania as natural gas hubs.
There are a number of critical questions related to the 
European Commission’s negotiating position on the 
Southern corridor with Turkey. The EU emphasises the 
need for further reforms in the Turkish natural gas mar-
ket, but has not yet opened the Energy chapter in the 
accession negotiations. The Turkish demand to channel 
15 per cent of the natural gas from transit projects to 
domestic supply is perceived as unacceptable, but the EU 
should pay more attention to the energy security of a fu-
ture member. Between 2004 and 2009, valuable time 
was lost in securing the necessary volumes for the pipe-
line projects of the Southern corridor. Turkmenistan 
signed new supply agreements with Russia and China; 
Azerbaijan signed an agreement with Russia. The recent 
activities of the Nabucco partner companies towards se-
curing concessions in the region are a step in the right 
direction. However, a natural gas purchase agreement 
with the Shah Deniz consortium in Azerbaijan has not yet 
been signed, although it is essential for the investment 
decision with regard to the initial phase of the Southern 
corridor. There are problems regarding the other poten-
tial suppliers eligible for the second phase of the project. 
Iran, with the second largest gas reserves in the world, is 
not yet ready to resolve its nuclear dispute with the USA 
and Europe peacefully. The other potential gas supplier, 
Turkmenistan, needs new investments to increase gas 
production. The Arab pipeline carrying Egyptian gas may 
be extended to Turkey in a short time, but the pipeline 
capacity and the increasing demand in transit countries 
Jordan and Syria will limit the volumes available at the 
Turkish border. Iraq is on the way to becoming an impor-
tant gas supplier for Turkey and the Southern Corridor. 
Foreign consortiums participating in the oil field auctions 
of the Iraqi government are hopeful of supplying at least 
the second phase of the Nabucco project. As already de-
scribed, there is a huge gas supply potential in the region, 
but gas sales agreements are necessary to trigger invest-
ment. The development of the Southern Corridor will put 
the EU’s external energy policy to the test. The collapse 
of the Southern corridor will harm the credibility of the 
EU in the region and put pressure on EU–Turkey relations.
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6. Turkey and EU Membership
In December 1964, Turkey became an associate member 
of the EEC, with the prospect of full membership. After 
40 years, at the December 2004 summit, the EU declared 
that Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen Political Criteria 
to a considerable extent and that accession negotiations 
should be started. During the following years, relations 
between the EU and Turkey again changed for the worse 
after repeated statements from Berlin and Paris about a 
»privileged partnership« instead of full membership and 
Turkey’s reluctance to extend the Association Agreement 
with the EU to the Greek part of Cyprus until the isolation 
of the Turkish part of the island is lifted.11
Turkey will play a crucial role in future energy supplies to 
Europe. Turkey has close ties with the countries of the 
Caspian Region and the Middle East and a well devel-
oped energy infrastructure. The EU should encourage 
Turkey to speed up the accession negotiations and to be-
come a member of the community in the near future. 
The support of the Turkish public for EU membership has 
fallen dramatically in recent years. It is not excluded that 
the next generation in Turkey might not even want to 
join the EU, even if all the criteria have been fulfilled.12 
Many observers in Europe understand the importance of 
Turkey’s membership for the future of the EU. The EU 
needs Turkey not only for its energy security, but also for 
the contribution it would make to the European econ-
omy, the European defence system, European neigh-
bourhood policy (Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle 
East) and the dialogue with the Islamic world. With a 
strong political will on both sides and a fixed date for Tur-
key’s membership, Turkey may become a member of the 
EU within a few years.
11.  Bahri Yılmaz, The Relations of Turkey with the European Union: Can-
didate Forever? Center for European Studies at Harvard University Work-
ing Paper Series No. 167 (2008). Available at: http://www.ces.fas.harvard.
edu/publications/docs/pdfs/CES_167.pdf (accessed on 8 March 2010).
12.  See footnote 11. 
7. Conclusions
Turkey has gained in strategic importance for the EU be-
cause of its unique geographical location between the 
gas-rich countries of the Caspian Region and the Middle 
East and the gas consuming countries of Europe.13 Thus, 
the EU is trying to use the opportunity to diversify its en-
ergy imports by establishing the Southern Corridor via 
Turkey. But there are worries among the Europeans that 
Turkey, losing interest in joining the EU, may shift politi-
cally to the East and form alliances with the Middle East-
ern countries and the Islamic world. Truly, Turkey has his-
toric relations with most of the Islamic countries and has 
intensified its economic and political relations to these 
countries in recent years. However, according to some 
political analysts, an alliance between Turkey and Russia 
in the future is much more likely. Russia, with its vast re-
sources, and Turkey’s dynamic industry and young popu-
lation may contribute to one another’s prosperity. For Tur-
key, Russia is also its principal energy supplier, as it is for 
the EU. Intensified energy cooperation between Russia 
and Turkey therefore makes considerable sense, but for 
the EU it may have two main consequences: on the one 
hand, it may help to increase gas volumes flowing to EU 
countries, while, on the other hand, it may harm the EU’s 
efforts to diversify its gas imports. As a result, the EU 
would be well advised to deepen its energy cooperation 
with Turkey.
13.  Sascha Müller-Kraenner, Energy Security. Earthscan, London, 2008.
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New Approaches in Russia’s Foreign Energy Policy – East and West
Tatiana Mitrova
1. Is Russia Turning East?
The role of Russia in the global energy balance can hardly 
be overestimated: accounting for only 2 per cent of the 
world population and GDP, Russia possesses 9 per cent 
of global oil reserves and 30 per cent of global gas re-
serves, and produces roughly 11.5 per cent of global pri-
mary energy. The country exports two-thirds of all oil, 
one-third of all coal and one-third of all gas produced, 
not to mention so-called »hidden energy exports«, in the 
form of energy-intensive products, such as aluminium 
and fertilisers. The annual energy exports of the Russian 
Federation are equal to twice Germany’s annual volume 
of consumption, making Russia an extremely important 
player on the global energy scene. Therefore, Russia’s for-
eign energy strategy is of key importance for all market 
participants.
This strategy is formulated most clearly in the new docu-
ment »Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 
2030« (ES-2030), adopted by the Russian government in 
November 2009. This document focuses primarily on the 
domestic agenda – modernisation in both energy and 
non-energy sectors – as it is necessary to reduce Russia’s 
dependence on energy exports, the country’s energy in-
tensity and the share of gas in the electricity generation 
sector. Nevertheless, the main priorities of international 
cooperation in the field of energy are also named in this 
Strategy.
A first strategic priority is diversification of the product 
structure of exports. In this respect, the share of exported 
oil products should increase significantly and the share of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) in gas exports should reach 
14–15 per cent by 2030. For a number of historical and 
geographical reasons Russia, the leading gas power, en-
tered the LNG market only in 2005, with swap LNG car-
goes. Large-scale LNG production started in Russia as late 
as February 2009, with the Sakhalin-2 project. LNG offers 
Russia flexibility in its exports, the possibility of reaching 
any consumer in the Atlantic basin (from the Shtokman 
project) and the Pacific basin (from Sakhalin). Moreover, 
LNG offers the potential both for new markets and for 
improving security of supply to existing markets, a con-
cern which remains an extremely important factor in Rus-
sia’s external energy strategy, given the severe transit dis-
putes which have occurred.
In 2008–09, Russia has experienced turbulent times, par-
ticularly with regard to the drop in gas demand both 
from the EU and its own domestic customers. However, 
when the market begins to recover, Russia will be well 
placed to take advantage of it, and increases in flexibility 
undertaken now will be of particular importance. Given 
the considerable uncertainty on export markets, Russia 
will use a market-oriented and flexible approach in gas 
exports. The crises, falling gas demand on the domestic 
market and lower demand abroad mean that Russia will 
be in less of a hurry to implement its mega-projects. In 
the short to medium term, depending on the market 
situation, production goals can be revised downwards. 
However, Russia has sufficient capacity and flexibility to 
meet higher demand in the course of economic recovery. 
Russia will therefore adjust the timelines of new invest-
ments in hydrocarbon production and transportation, de-
pending on their economic viability.
A second priority is the diversification of export markets, 
primarily to the Asian market. Russia’s hydrocarbon in-
dustry is currently orientated firmly towards the west. In 
2008, only 14 million tonnes of crude oil were exported 
to the Asia Pacific region, against a total export volume 
to all destinations of 243 million tonnes. The vast major-
ity (185 million tonnes) went to Europe. The picture is 
even clearer in gas, with no major exports to Asia until 
2009 at all. While Russia does not foresee Europe ceasing 
to be the main destination for hydrocarbon exports, it 
does foresee an increase in the role of Asia, which ap-
pears fully justifiable in light of China’s continued eco-
nomic growth, even during a period of severe global re-
cession.
Although they have not played a major role in Russia’s 
energy balance until now, the country’s eastern regions 
are expected to take on more importance over the next 
20 years, eventually producing around a fifth of all Rus-
sia’s oil and gas. This is both a geological and an economic 
issue, as the search for untapped resources leads Russia 
in the direction of some of its largest potential emerging 
markets. Russia’s ability to supply these markets will be a 
key indicator of how well Russia’s energy strategy allows 
the country to fulfil its potential. The challenge facing 
Russia is whether it can be an energy giant on two con-
tinents simultaneously: to do so, it will need not only the 
natural resources, but also the infrastructure and the pol-
icy framework to make it happen. ES-2030 predicts a 
gradual increase in oil exports to Asia of 70–80 million 
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tonnes by 2030, while gas exports are predicted to rise 
to 70–75 billion cubic metres (bcm) (reaching approxi-
mately 20 per cent of total gas exports). The target in the 
Energy Strategy is to increase the share of energy exports 
to Asian markets to 26–27 per cent of total energy ex-
ports, while sustaining export volumes to European mar-
kets.
Given that hydrocarbon exports to the Far East are set-
ting out from a relatively undeveloped position, one vital 
question addressed by policy-makers is the establishment 
of new export routes in the east of Russia. To this end, 
state oil transportation company Transneft has already 
constructed the first phase of the East Siberia–Pacific 
Ocean (ESPO) pipeline, reaching the Chinese border, 
while the Russian government has instituted a zero rate 
of export tax for three years. The situation with gas pipe-
lines to Asia is more complicated. In 2006, the govern-
ment announced the two potential directions of gas sup-
ply to China. The Western route includes the Altay gas 
pipeline, with a total length of 2,700 km on Russian ter-
ritory and a resource base in Western Siberia. The Eastern 
route would source the gas from a resource base in East-
ern Siberia, especially from the Yakutsk Region. This 
route implies the construction of a pipeline running from 
Yakutia through Khabarovsk to Vladivostok. There was 
also an additional option: to construct a gas pipeline 
from Sakhalin to the Russian mainland and down to 
Vladivostok. This project is listed among the top priority 
projects in the East and will take the form of a 1,800 km 
gas pipeline from Sakhalin through Khabarovsk to Vladi-
vostok. The first starting complex will be put into opera-
tion in the third quarter of 2011.
A third component of the Russian energy strategy is the 
diversification of export routes in order to increase secu-
rity of supply and reduce transit risks. Several huge 
projects can be mentioned in this regard: the Baltic Pipe-
line System-2 (BPS-2), Burgas–Alexandroupolis, Samsun–
Ceyhan for oil transportation and Nord Stream and South 
Stream for gas. Russia currently has a range of positions 
on these pipeline projects. BPS-2 is under construction, 
while two competing projects to bypass the Bosporus – 
Burgas–Alexandroupolis and Samsun–Ceyhan – are still 
in the phase of preliminary negotiations. Nord Stream 
has made major progress in recent months: Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland have given their permission; 
29 banks have confirmed their readiness to participate in 
financing; new long-term contracts for gas supplies 
through this pipeline have been signed; one of Europe’s 
leading energy companies – GDF SUEZ – is now discuss-
ing its participation in the project; and 1 April 2010 has 
been announced as a starting date for the off-shore part 
of construction. South Stream is at a less advanced stage; 
nevertheless, some success was achieved in 2008–09: 
intergovernmental cooperation agreements were signed 
with Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece and Serbia in order to 
construct pipeline sections in the respective countries; 
new long-term contracts for gas supplies were signed; 
and the participation of Électricité de France (EDF) in the 
project is under discussion.
2. What’s New in the West?
EU–Russian energy relations are complicated and 
weighed down by emotional and political considerations 
to such an extent that, in many cases, it defies economic 
logic. Clearly, there is more interdependence than de-
pendence. The EU needs Russian oil and gas – their large-
scale replacement is impossible: dependence could be 
reduced only partially using other sources of hydrocarbon 
supply, as well as nuclear and renewable energy. This 
dependence is balanced, however, by Russia’s desire to 
ensure its own social and economic development. Sales 
of Russian hydrocarbons to the EU are as necessary for 
Russia as hydrocarbon imports are for the EU. Neither 
partner, therefore, has serious alternatives. But despite 
more than 40 years of mutually beneficial energy rela-
tions (which developed dynamically regardless of the Iron 
Curtain, the Cold War and fundamentally different polit-
ical and economic systems), today these relations are 
going through a very difficult patch.
The EU wants Russia to increase investment and to radi-
cally increase the participation of Western companies in 
energy production. Russia is irritated by Europe’s backing 
for »selected projects« (above all, the Nabucco and Trans-
Caspian pipelines); the European Commission’s unclear 
position on long-term contracts; the marked opposition in 
some political circles to export pipelines under construc-
tion by Gazprom; the many obstacles placed in the way 
of Gazprom participation downstream; and, most impor-
tant, by Europe’s efforts to diversify gas supplies, 26 per 
cent of which currently come from Russia. The European 
Commission has called for an active search for alterna-
tive supplies of gas, as well as increased use of liquefied 
natural gas, although it is obvious that the alternatives to 
21
KRISTIN LINKE, MARCEL VIËTOR (EDS.)  |  PROSPECTS OF A TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP?
Russia – Iran, Central Asia, North Africa, Nigeria and so 
on – carry high political risks and have unstable economic 
systems, as do many of the countries through which 
Europe would have to lay new transit routes.
Russia’s symmetrical response – the concept of strategic 
reserves; restrictions on foreign participation in produc-
tion and Gazprom’s monopoly on transport and export; 
increased cooperation with other gas producers within 
the framework of the Forum of Gas Exporting Countries; 
and efforts to diversify export markets (northeast Asia, 
LNG) – has in turn generated alarm among European 
consumers. Even the projects designed to ensure security 
of supply to Europe, as a solution to painful transit dis-
putes, are in many cases perceived negatively in the EU 
and, somewhat irrationally, regarded as a threat to EU 
energy security.
This irrational element in EU–Russian energy relations is 
not only ruining mutual trust, but also leading to ineffi-
cient investments and destroying beneficial cooperation. 
Russia and the EU complement each other with regard to 
energy by virtue of geographical proximity, transport in-
frastructure and traditional ties. Clarification of this 
rather obvious thesis will probably be the most important 
priority of Russia’s external energy strategy in the me-
dium term.
In contrast, energy relations between Russia and Turkey 
– involving several of the abovementioned projects – 
despite many contradictions and different interests, are 
very clear, being based entirely on pragmatic economic 
incentives. The countries have cooperated in many 
spheres for several decades. In 1987, the first supplies of 
Russian gas to Turkey started (with transit through Roma-
nia and Bulgaria), and in 2003 gas exports started though 
Blue Stream. Until 31 December 2008, a total of about 
200 bcm of Russian gas had been exported to Turkey. In 
2008 export volumes reached nearly 24 bcm.
Turkey has recently approved South Stream crossing its 
part of the Black Sea and in August 2009 agreed to 
launch, with Russia, the pipeline project Samsun–Ceyhan, 
from Turkey’s Black Sea coast to its Mediterranean coast, 
across Anatolia (which is profitable and attractive for 
Turkey, which wishes to become a new hydrocarbon hub 
for Europe). But it has terminated the tender for the first 
nuclear plant construction (in which Inter RAO was the 
major participant) and for the same economic reasons is 
actively promoting the Nabucco pipeline. Nevertheless, 
all these decisions are driven by clear economic logic and 
therefore are accepted by Russia (similarly, Turkey has 
demonstrated tolerance towards Russian decisions). This 
relationship can be described as absolutely pragmatic on 
both sides, with a clear understanding of the mutual 
benefits of energy cooperation.
Turkey’s prospective role in Russia’s foreign energy policy 
seems to be increasingly important, as there are several 
huge projects in all major energy sectors – oil, gas and 
nuclear. Infrastructure development is advancing, with 
Turkey likely to become one of the key hubs for Russian 
energy resources en route to Europe. This will have a 
number of implications, not only for Russian–Turkish eco-
nomic ties, but also for EU–Russian relations, as a Turkey 
able to provide a new large-scale corridor for hydrocar-
bon transportation will have much greater leverage in 
negotiations with both sides. There is a very fragile bal-
ance between the three players in this Russia–EU–Turkey 
triangle, but mutual interest in sustaining this energy 
supply chain will make them follow a cautious policy of 
compromise.
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The EU, Russia and Turkey – Prospects of an Energy Triangle?
Stefan Meister
1. Introduction
Energy is the driving force in relations between Russia, 
Turkey and the EU. Russia is the world’s biggest supplier 
of gas and the second biggest supplier of oil, with the 
biggest gas resources, followed by Iran and Qatar. The EU 
and Turkey increasingly need to import energy: at the 
moment, the EU obtains around one-third of its oil and 
40 per cent of its gas from Russia, while Turkey receives 
25 per cent of its oil and 65 per cent of its gas from there. 
Indeed, 80 per cent of Russia’s gas exports go to the EU, 
around 80 per cent of which are transported through 
Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia sends 40 per cent of its oil 
exports through the Bosporus. Because of its dependency 
on gas transit through Ukraine, Russia is trying to diver-
sify by building the Nord Stream and South Stream pipe-
lines. Within this framework, Germany is the northern 
hub for Russian gas and Turkey the southern one.
Russia, Turkey and the EU increasingly depend on each 
other but they have different concepts of energy security. 
Both Turkey and the EU are trying to diversify their import 
routes and, thus, reduce their import dependency on 
Russia, while Moscow is seeking new markets for its en-
ergy, especially in East Asia. So far, bilateral approaches 
have been dominant in relations between Turkey, Russia 
and the EU; a trilateral approach has not yet been tested. 
Especially in the energy sector, all three players depend 
on each other and cooperation in a trilateral format 
could be beneficial for all. Therefore we must ask whether 
there is a chance of reaching a common understanding 
of energy security in the future, as well as a new perspec-
tive on trilateral cooperation in this field.
This chapter analyses, first, the changes in Turkish foreign 
policy and the Russian–Turkish rapprochement in recent 
years, which is the basis for new developments in the 
southern neighbourhood of the EU. The second part 
analyses EU–Russia energy relations and the role of 
Turkey with regard to this relationship. After, third, look-
ing at geopolitical changes as a result of the Russian–
Georgian war in August 2008 in the South Caucasus, the 
article concludes with a discussion of the prospects for an 
energy triangle between Russia, Turkey and the EU.
2. Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy
Since the Justice and Development Party or AKP came to 
power in 2002, Turkey has attempted to become a key 
regional power by more active diplomacy and playing a 
constructive role through a good-neighbourhood policy 
with all of its neighbours. This includes improving rela-
tions with Iran, Syria and Iraq; enhancing economic co-
operation with Russia; and normalising relations with 
Armenia. This new approach is related to Turkey’s interest 
in joining the EU and the limited success of its previous 
foreign policy concept. With the end of the Soviet Union, 
Turkey unavailingly tried to become a regional player in 
Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Ankara hoped to 
play an active role, especially in the state-building proc-
esses in Central Asia and tried to export the Turkish 
model of democracy, secularism and modernity to the 
region. But Turkey never really managed to penetrate the 
region economically and politically, even though Russia’s 
position declined throughout the 1990s. The emergence 
of authoritarian states in Central Asia made it difficult to 
establish the Turkish policy model. Pan-Turkism has been 
perceived in Central Asia as a challenge to the sover-
eignty of the young states. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
in particular have repeatedly curtailed their cooperation 
with Turkey, accusing Ankara of supporting political dis-
sidents from their countries. And with regard to the 
Southern Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan 
were more preoccupied with their domestic policy and 
relations with Russia than with Ankara, although Turkey 
has been a major trading partner for all three states.1
Turkey is geographically close to the world’s most energy-
rich regions, which have over 70 per cent of the proven 
global oil and gas reserves. It is interested in becoming a 
key energy transit hub for the transportation of natural 
gas from the Caspian region, the Middle East and the 
Persian Gulf to European markets. As an energy hub, 
Turkey would secure transit revenues and taxes, receive 
part of the gas in order to meet its own rising energy de-
mand and also, Ankara hopes, reduce its dependence on 
Russian natural gas imports. Furthermore, as a key coun-
try for oil and gas transit to the EU, the Turkish govern-
ment hopes to improve its position in the accession 
1.  On Turkey’s trade relations with Russia and the South Caucasian 
states, see Gareth Winrow, ›Turkey, Russia and the Caucasus. Common 
and diverging interests‹, Chatham House Briefing Paper, November 2009, 
p. 4. Available at: http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/15211_bp1109
turkey.pdf (accessed on 8 March 2010).
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negotiations. With the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–
Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, Turkey has already become an 
important transit state for the transport of significant vol-
umes of crude oil, especially from Azerbaijan. Since the 
Russian–Ukrainian gas conflict in January 2009, interest 
has increased considerably in the EU with regard to build-
ing the Nabucco gas pipeline (with a volume of 31 billion 
cubic metres) which would deliver non-Russian gas to 
Europe. Turkey would become the key transit state for 
this pipeline project. This would enable the EU member 
states and Turkey to become less dependent on Russian 
gas imports and on transportation routes through Russia.
3. Russian–Turkish Relations
Since Turkey’s position as a NATO outpost in relation to 
the Soviet Union ended, Russian–Turkish relations have 
been shaped by a combination of cooperation and rivalry 
in the past 20 years. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
Turkey and Russia were seemingly rivals in the newly 
emerging geopolitics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
while economic cooperation between both countries in-
creased. At the political level, Turkey’s limited support for 
the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to a rapprochement 
between Moscow and Ankara. Russian policy-makers 
started to perceive Turkey as a foreign policy actor which 
was becoming more and more independent of the USA. 
In the context of Russian foreign policy thinking, Turkey 
is a potential ally against a dominant USA in the South 
Caucasus. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s trip to Turkey 
in December 2004 was the first high-ranking visit from 
the Russian side for 32 years, and Putin has already met 
with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ten 
times in five years.
The economy is the driving force of the new Russian–
Turkish rapprochement: Russia replaced Germany as 
Turkey’s main trading partner in 2008, at 38 billion US 
dollars. Since 2006, Russia has been Turkey’s largest 
source of natural gas imports. In 2002, the two countries 
completed the 16 billion cubic metre capacity Blue 
Stream gas pipeline, connecting the Russian and Turkish 
coasts at the bottom of the Black Sea. Turkey is also the 
third largest importer of Russian coal, after Ukraine and 
the UK. Two-thirds of the tankers crossing the Turkish 
Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits carry Russian oil and gas 
exports. Turkey primarily exports textiles, machinery and 
vehicles, chemicals and food to Russia. The Turkish con-
struction sector is very active in Russia and was involved 
in 29 billion US dollars worth of business in 2008. Nearly 
15,700 Turkish workers were sent to Russia in 2008 by 
the Turkish Employment Service, working primarily in the 
construction sector.2 Almost 3 million Russian tourists 
annually spend their holidays in Turkey, which is of enor-
mous economic significance. Nevertheless, the trade bal-
ance is weighted heavily in Russia’s favour. In 2008, 
Turkey exported to Russia goods worth 6.5 billion US dol-
lars, but imported more than 30 billion US dollars worth, 
primarily gas, oil and coal. In the military sector, Russia 
sold helicopters to Turkey and provided the NATO coun-
try with new air defence systems. In 2008, Russia secured 
a contract worth 80 million US dollars for the provision 
of anti-tank missiles.
For Russia, Turkey is not only an important energy transit 
route but also an alternative customer within the frame-
work of efforts to reduce its dependence as a supplier on 
the EU market. Turkey is the third largest importer of 
Russian gas after Ukraine and Germany, accounting for 
23.8 billion cubic metres in 2008. Russia is trying to 
strengthen its position in the Eastern Mediterranean and 
to reduce the influence of NATO and the USA in the re-
gion by means of its rapprochement with Turkey. Turkey’s 
NATO membership has not proved to be an obstacle with 
regard to energy partnership with Russia. Through closer 
cooperation with Turkey, Russia hopes to reduce the in-
fluence of NATO and the EU in the region and, in return, 
is willing to cede some influence to Turkey, as can be ob-
served, for example, in Moscow’s moderate reaction to 
the Turkish–Armenian rapprochement. Both Ankara and 
Moscow appeared to perceive US policies in the South 
Caucasus under the Bush administration as destabilising. 
Russia is attentively observing Turkey’s difficult accession 
negotiations with the EU and is offering Ankara deeper 
economic cooperation. With the visit of Russian Premier 
Putin to Ankara in August 2009 and the implementation 
of the contracts related to South Stream and further en-
ergy cooperation between the two countries, Russia has 
successfully integrated Turkey in its policy and is trying to 
strengthen its position in the Black Sea region. Moscow 
feels that it will benefit from the disagreements between 
EU member states with regard to Turkey’s EU accession. 
2.  Cf. Ahmet İçduygu, ›International migration system between Turkey 
and Russia: the case of project-tied migrant workers in Moscow‹, Euro-
pean University Institute, Florence, Research Report, 18/2009. Available 
at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/12254/2/CARIM_RR_
2009_18.pdf (accessed on 8 March 2010).
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On the other hand, Turkey is trying to use its geopolitical 
location as a bargaining tool between Russia and the EU.
4. EU–Russia Energy Relations and Turkey
Energy relations between the EU and Russia are in crisis 
at the moment. The Ukrainian–Russian gas conflict of 
early 2009 has inflicted lasting damage on trust between 
Russia and the EU. There is no consensus between the EU 
member states on how to develop cooperation with Rus-
sia in the future and on whether more economic interde-
pendence is really the right approach for security in Eu-
rope.3 Russian Premier Putin cancelled Russia’s signature 
of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) in 2009, which is of 
the highest priority for the EU. On the other hand, the 
Russian proposal for a new energy framework agreement 
has so far met with little interest within the EU. The Eu-
ropean Commission has been pushing its unbundling 
and liberalisation policy, especially in the gas market. This 
includes ownership unbundling of energy companies and 
their electricity and gas transmission networks. In con-
trast, the aim of Gazprom is to be able to provide the 
entire value chain also on the European market in the fu-
ture. The Russian government wants to secure long-term 
agreements with customers, guarantees for investments 
and access to the attractive European-end customer mar-
ket through a new legal agreement on energy coopera-
tion.
In the context of EU–Russian energy relations, Turkey is 
looked at in two ways: on the one hand, for Russia and 
some European countries, Turkey is a relatively secure 
and independent transit route, in contrast to Ukraine 
(South Stream). On the other hand, other member states 
perceive Turkey as an alternative route for importing non-
Russian energy (Nabucco). The EU and Turkey have been 
engaged in developing the so-called »Southern Energy 
Corridor« to carry Caspian and Middle Eastern oil and 
gas to Europe, in addition to the existing routes bringing 
resources from Russia, Norway and Algeria.4 With its 
good bilateral relations with Russia and the EU, Turkey 
3.  Cf. Stefan Meister, ›Crisis in Russia–EU energy relationship‹, in: DGAP-
aktuell, June 2009. Available at: http://www.dgap.org/midcom-serve
attachmentguid-1de5434f928abf6543411de852ed7fabd3334ff34ff/
2009-04_dgapaktuell_rus-eu_www.pdf (accessed on 8 March 2010).
4.  Jose Manuel Barroso, ›New Silk Route‹, The Southern Corridor 
Summit, Prague, 8 May 2009. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/228&format=HTML&aged=0&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed on 8 March 2010).
has achieved a balance between both and has increased 
its geopolitical importance in the region. For Turkey, the 
main challenge in the next few years will be to preserve 
this balance, especially in the context of EU accession. 
The latest Turkish energy legislation, adopted in April 
2001, was inspired by EU energy legislation, while An-
kara ratified the Energy Charter Treaty in the same year.
There has been some rivalry between Turkey and Russia 
in the past over pipeline policy. Moscow criticised the 
Turkish participation in the Nabucco project and in the 
construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, which 
has become the first major oil pipeline in the region to 
bypass Russia. The signing of treaties between the states 
participating in the Nabucco pipeline project in Ankara in 
July 2009 was an important step towards its implementa-
tion. But it is still uncertain where the gas is supposed to 
come from to fill the pipeline. Ankara is interested in 
leaving the door open to all options for cooperation in 
the region and Nabucco would provide an opportunity to 
become less dependent on Russia. There are also plans to 
connect Turkey with Italy by means of the 12 billion cubic 
metre Interconnector Turkey–Greece–Italy (ITGI) and a 
possible 20 billion cubic metre Trans-Adriatic pipeline. 
The first part of the ITGI has brought small volumes of 
Azeri gas to Greece since November 2009.
Russia is pushing its alternative project, South Stream, 
which includes the construction of a 24 billion euro gas 
pipeline with a final capacity of 63 billion cubic metres, 
running across the Black Sea to Bulgaria, before separat-
ing into two lines which would extend to Italy and Aus-
tria. South Stream would pass through Turkish territorial 
waters. Ankara was afraid that gas scheduled for Turkey 
would instead go through South Stream to the EU. To ad-
dress Turkish concerns and finally obtain permission to 
build South Stream through Turkish territorial waters, 
Russian Premier Putin made some concessions to Ankara. 
The Russian oil pipeline operator Transneft and oil com-
pany Rusneft agreed to form a consortium with Italian 
ENI and the Turkish company Çalık Energy to build a new 
oil pipeline from the Turkish Black Sea port of Samsun to 
the Ceyhan oil terminal on the Mediterranean coast.5 An 
important goal of this deal is to relieve the narrow oil cor-
ridor at the Bosporus. Further development of the ports 
5.  Saban Kardas, ›Russia joins the Samsun-Ceyhan Pipeline‹, in: Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, Issue 195. Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/
single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35649&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7
&cHash=f1793bc6f4 (accessed on 8 March 2010).
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in Samsun and Ceyhan will strengthen Turkey’s position 
as an energy hub. The Blue Stream pipeline also ends in 
Samsun which, in cooperation with ENI, brings Russian 
gas into the Turkish national pipeline network. Russia has 
also agreed to cooperate in building an additional pipe-
line – Blue Stream 2 – to Samsun, which would supply 
with gas not only Turkey but also Israel, Lebanon, Syria 
and Cyprus. Ceyhan is the final destination of the BTC oil 
pipeline. Other deals have raised the prospect of 
Gazprom’s involvement in building gas storage deposits 
in Turkey and a liquefaction plant for natural gas in 
Ceyhan. The third element – a plan to build a nuclear 
power station by a Russian–Turkish consortium in the 
Southern Akkuyu region – was cancelled by the Turkish 
side in November 2009. However, plans to build nuclear 
power stations in Turkey with Russian Atomstroiexport 
still exist.6 These agreements not only strengthen estab-
lished Turkish–Russian–Italian energy relations, but also 
political and economic interdependence between Ankara 
and Moscow.
5. The South Caucasus after the 
Russian–Georgian Conflict
The Russian–Georgian conflict in August 2008 changed 
the geopolitical situation in the Caucasus. The Turkish 
strategy of seeking harmonious relations with all its 
neighbours was challenged by the conflict. Turkey’s in-
creasing dependence on Russian energy imports also re-
stricted its freedom of manoeuvre: there was little criti-
cism of the Russian military operation by the Turkish gov-
ernment.7 The situation is even more complex because 
Turkey has provided considerable support to the armed 
forces of Georgia and Azerbaijan, helping them to adapt 
to NATO standards. Ankara has also founded military 
academies in Baku and Tbilisi and modernised two air-
bases in Georgia. After the conflict, Russian officials 
therefore listed Turkey as one of the countries that had 
supplied military equipment to Georgia.
6.  ›Turkey’s radioactive waltz with Russia comes to an end‹, on Radio 
Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 17.12.2009. Available at: http://www.rferl.
org/content/Turkeys_Radioactive_Waltz_With_Russia_Comes_To_An_
End/1885889.html (accessed on 8 March 2010).
7.  Cf. ›Turkey cannot afford disruption in ties with Russia, says Erdoğan‹, 
in Hürriyet, 01.09.2008. Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.
com/h.php?news=turkey-cannot-afford-disruption-in-ties-with-russia-
says-erdogan-2008-09-01 (accessed on 8 March 2010).
Turkey’s immediate reaction to the Russian–Georgian war 
was to introduce a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation 
Platform (CSCP). Shortly after the conflict, Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdoğan visited Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan 
to promote the concept. The main goal of the CSCP is to 
complement regional institutions and mechanisms to 
provide a framework for stability, confidence building 
and cooperation and to become a forum of dialogue.8 
Russia supported the initiative because it would not in-
clude the USA, NATO and the EU, but only states from 
the region. Concrete steps with regard to the initiative 
are still lacking, however, and it is still not clear whether 
it will be successful, because of the existing conflicts be-
tween the associated countries. Georgia in particular has 
no interest in negotiating with Russia on a platform that 
does not include the USA or the EU.
In the context of the conflict, concerns were raised about 
the security of pipelines in the Southern Caucasus and 
Turkey. Turkey’s interest in becoming a key energy transit 
state was challenged by the changing security situation 
in South Caucasus. On the other hand, the conflict 
opened up possibilities for Turkey to normalise its rela-
tions with Armenia.9 This development has influenced 
relations with Azerbaijan, which has developed close ties 
with Ankara over recent years. Currently, Georgia is the 
only land corridor connecting Turkey and Azerbaijan and 
the Caspian region. It is questionable, however, how safe 
energy investments in Georgia will be, unless Georgian–
Russian relations improve. If, in the meantime, a new 
land corridor to the Caspian region could be established 
via Armenia, once the border between Armenia and 
Turkey opens, this would have strategic consequences for 
energy transit in the Caucasus region, as well as for 
Turkey.
The improved relations between Russia and Turkey influ-
ence the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where Turkish and 
Russian interests are in opposition. Russia unofficially 
supports Armenia and Turkey Azerbaijan. This balance 
has also been challenged by the Turkish–Armenian rap-
prochement and the rise of Azerbaijan as an oil and gas 
8.  Cf. Eleni Fotiou, ›Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform: what 
is at stake for regional cooperation?‹, ICBSS Policy Brief, No. 16, June 
2009. Available at: http://icbss.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task
=doc_download&gid=622 (accessed on 8 March 2010).
9.  Cf. Maciej Falkowski, ›Turkey’s game for the Caucasus‹, in: OSW-
Commentary, Issue 29, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, 5.10.2009. 
Available at: http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Commentary_29.
pdf (accessed on 8 March 2010).
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producer. Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan are driven by 
the frozen conflict on Nagorno-Karabakh and the situa-
tion with regard to Azeri oil exports. With the Azeri–
Georgian agreement on oil supply to Georgia in 2007 
and the acquisition of the Georgian supply network by 
the Azeri state oil company SOCAR, Baku is challenging 
Russia’s role in the Southern Caucasus. In addition, Rus-
sian gas supplies to Armenia go through the Georgian 
pipeline network, which is now owned by the Azeri state 
company.
Enhanced economic cooperation between Russia and 
Turkey can help to increase the pressure on the opposing 
parties in the Karabakh conflict in order to find a solu-
tion. Both have an interest in the stability of the region as 
this is an important precondition of trading in oil and gas. 
Good relations between Ankara and Moscow are also a 
precondition of the Turkish rapprochement with Arme-
nia. But if the Armenian–Turkish question is solved with-
out, in parallel, regulating the Nagorno-Karabakh con-
flict, Azerbaijan could interrupt its relations with Turkey 
and seek more cooperation with Russia.
6. Are There Prospects of an Energy Triangle 
between the EU, Russia and Turkey?
As the Russian reaction on the EU’s Eastern partnership 
project recently showed, Moscow increasingly perceives 
the EU as a competitor for influence in the post-Soviet 
space. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, on multi-
ple occasions, has condemned the establishment of the 
Eastern Partnership without Russia’s participation and 
has equated it with the establishment of an »EU zone of 
interest in Eastern Europe«.10 In the perception of the 
Russian political elite, international relations are a zero-
sum game, and there is no possible win–win situation in 
the common neighbourhood with the EU. Besides its 
Soviet arsenal of nuclear weapons and its membership of 
the UN Security Council, energy is the only tool available 
to Russia to pursue its great power ambitions. On the 
other hand, Russia is extremely interested in an economic 
modernisation partnership with the EU and needs Euro-
pean investment in its infrastructure and energy sector 
and for technical cooperation. Therefore, it is necessary 
10.  The Eastern Partnership, established in May 2009, is meant to expand 
and deepen the existing Neighbourhood Policy of the EU with Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine, as well as with the Caucasus states Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia.
to integrate Russia into concrete projects of common in-
terest in the region, in areas such as energy security, en-
vironmental protection and economic cooperation.
The EU has only just started to develop a common energy 
policy, since this is a policy area still determined by na-
tional interests. We can observe an overreaction on the 
part of some EU member states with regard to what 
Russia could do, especially with its energy power. The 
politicisation of energy relations between Russia and the 
EU is unfortunately often used as an instrument in rela-
tion to conflicts in other policy areas, on both sides. For 
the EU as a whole, it is important to develop a common 
internal and external energy policy. The EU is still the 
most attractive market for energy supply in the world but 
it has to strengthen its negotiating power by means of a 
common energy strategy. Russia is now the most impor-
tant supplier of oil and gas to the EU and will remain so 
in the foreseeable future. Russia has the resources, geo-
graphical proximity and pipeline infrastructure to supply 
the EU cost-efficiently. Only if the EU and its member 
states are aware of how to develop a common energy 
policy in the future and how to integrate Turkey in this 
context, will they be able to offer Russia and Turkey pro-
posals for common cooperation.
Turkey is the European gate to Central Asia and the Mid-
dle East. It can become an important transit route not 
only for energy supplies from Russia but also from the 
Caspian Sea, the Middle East and the Gulf region to the 
EU. The slow accession negotiations between Ankara 
and Brussels, without much discernible progress, may be 
an obstacle to deeper energy cooperation. But to use 
Nabucco as a bargaining chip in the negotiations with 
the EU, as Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan did, is hardly 
the right approach to confidence building.11 Neverthe-
less, Turkey must balance its ambitions as an independ-
ent regional power and as a future member of the EU. As 
an EU member state which is a key player in the region it 
can play a significant role by strengthening Brussels’s po-
sition in the Caspian and Caucasian region but it must 
realign its relations with Russia.
The main future competitor for resources and influence 
in the Caspian and Central Asian region for all three 
11. Cf. ›Türkei stellt Nabucco-Pipeline in Frage‹, in: Handelsblatt, 
20.01.2009. Available at: http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/interna-
tional/tuerkei-stellt-nabucco-pipeline-infrage;2129832 (accessed on 
8 March 2010).
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actors is China. Beijing is trying to secure its oil and gas 
needs with investments in, for instance, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Russia. The first part of a new gas 
pipeline between Turkmenistan and China was com-
pleted at the end of 2009. From 2013, 40 billion cubic 
metres of gas will go through this pipeline to China, by-
passing Russia. Russia will lose its transit monopoly on 
Central Asian resources, while the EU will possibly lose 
gas resources for the Nabucco pipeline. China has the 
economic and political power to enforce its energy inter-
ests in the region, while Moscow and Brussels still disa-
gree on whether they should construct South Stream or 
Nabucco or both.
An EU–Russia–Turkey energy triangle will not be achieved 
as long as short-term national interests dominate rela-
tions. There is some cooperation between Russian, 
Turkish and EU companies in the energy sector, but at the 
moment there is no common vision or interest with re-
gard to comprehensive trilateral energy cooperation. If 
Turkey joins the EU and Brussels develops a common en-
ergy policy, strategic cooperation with Russia on energy 
might be possible. The Lisbon Treaty constitutes a step in 
this direction. Only if all three players understand trilat-
eral energy cooperation as a win–win situation and not 
as a bargaining tool will an energy triangle be possible.
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